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Abstract	
Neuroscience	 is	 undergoing	 faster	 changes	 than	 ever	 before.	 Over	 100	 years	 our	 field	
qualitatively	 described	 and	 invasively	 manipulated	 single	 or	 few	 organisms	 to	 gain	
anatomical,	 physiological,	 and	 pharmacological	 insights.	 In	 the	 last	 10	 years	 neuroscience	
spawned	 quantitative	 big-sample	 datasets	 on	 microanatomy,	 synaptic	 connections,	
optogenetic	brain-behavior	assays,	and	high-level	cognition.	While	growing	data	availability	
and	 information	granularity	have	been	amply	discussed,	we	direct	attention	 to	a	 routinely	
neglected	 question:	 How	 will	 the	 unprecedented	 data	 richness	 shape	 data	 analysis	
practices?	Statistical	reasoning	is	becoming	more	central	to	distill	neurobiological	knowledge	
from	healthy	and	pathological	brain	recordings.	We	believe	that	large-scale	data	analysis	will	
use	 more	 models	 that	 are	 non-parametric,	 generative,	 mixing	 frequentist	 and	 Bayesian	
aspects,	and	grounded	in	different	statistical	inferences.	
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Introduction	
During	most	of	neuroscience	history,	new	insights	were	"inferred"	with	little	or	no	reliance	
on	statistics.	Qualitative,	often	anecdotal	reports	have	documented	impairments	after	brain	
lesion	 [1],	 microscopical	 inspection	 of	 stained	 tissue	 [2],	 electrical	 stimulation	 during	
neurosurgery	 [3],	 targeted	 pharmacological	 intervention	 [4],	 and	 brain	 connections	 using	
neuron-transportable	 dyes	 [5].	 Connectivity	 analysis	 by	 axonal	 tracing	 studies	 in	monkeys	
exemplifies	 biologically	 justified	 "inference"	 with	 many	 discoveries	 since	 the	 60s	 [6].	 A	
colored	tracer	substance	is	 injected	in	vivo	into	source	region	A,	uptaken	by	local	neuronal	
receptors,	and	automatically	 transported	 in	axons	to	target	region	B.	This	observation	 in	a	
single	monkey	allows	extrapolating	a	monosynaptical	connection	between	region	A	and	B	to	
the	 entire	monkey	 species	 [7].	 Instead,	 later	 brain-imaging	 technology	 propelled	 the	 data-
intensive	 characterization	 of	 the	 mammalian	 brain	 and	 today	 readily	 quantifies	 axonal	
connections,	myeloarchitectonic	 distributions,	 cytoarchitectonic	 borders,	 neurotransmitter	
receptors,	 and	 oscillatory	 coupling	 [8-11].	 Following	many	 new	 opportunities	 to	 generate	
digitized	 brain	 data,	 uncertainties	 about	 neurobiological	 phenomena	 henceforth	 required	
assessment	in	the	statistical	arena.	
In	the	quantitative	sciences,	the	invention	and	application	of	statistical	tools	has	always	been	
dictated	 by	 changing	 contexts	 and	 domain	 questions	 [12].	 As	 this	 appears	 to	 be	 less	
appreciated	 in	 current	 neuroscience,	 the	 present	 paper	 reviews	 how	 "optimal"	 statistical	
choices	are	likely	to	change	due	to	the	progressively	increasing	granularity	of	digitized	brain	
data.	Massive	 data	 collection	 is	 a	 game	 changer	 in	 neuroscience	 [9,	 13],	 and	many	 other	
public	and	scientific	areas	[14-16].	There	is	an	always-bigger	interest	in	and	pressure	for	data	
sharing,	 open	 access,	 and	 building	 "big-data"	 repositories	 [8,	 17,	 18].	 For	 instance,	 UK	
Biobank	 is	 a	 longitudinal	 population	 study	 dedicated	 to	 the	 genetic	 and	 environmental	
influence	on	mental	and	other	disorders.	500,000	enrolled	volunteers	undergo	an	impressive	
battery	of	 clinical	diagnostics	 from	brain	 scans	 to	bone	density	with	a	>25	year	 follow-up.	
Targeted	reanalysis	of	such	national	and	international	data	collections	will	soon	become	the	
new	 normal	 in	 neuroscience	 and	medicine.	 Statistical	 scalability	 to	 high-dimensional	 data	
will	therefore	be	inspected	from	the	independent	perspectives	of	i)	parametric	versus	non-
parametric,	ii)	discriminative	versus	generative,	and	iii)	frequentist	versus	Bayesian	statistical	
models	as	well	as	iv)	classical	hypothesis	testing	and	out-of-sample	generalization.	
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Towards	adaptive	models?	
Today,	parametric	models	are	 still	 the	obvious	choice	 in	neuroscience.	For	 instance,	many	
big-sample	studies	(i.e.,	data	from	hundreds	of	animals	or	humans)	currently	apply	the	same	
parametric	models	as	previous	small-sample	studies	(i.e.,	a	few	dozen	animals	or	humans).	
However,	 concentrating	 on	 sample	 size,	 parametric	 analyses	 such	 as	 Student's	 t-test,	
ANOVA,	and	Pearson's	linear	correlation	on	brain	data	from	many	hundred	individuals	may	
not	 yield	 an	 improved	 quality	 of	 statistical	 insight	 on	 a	 neurobiological	 phenomenon	 that	
could	not	already	be	achieved	with	a	dozen	participants	(Box	1).	An	important	caveat	relies	
in	their	systematic	inability	to	grow	in	complexity	no	matter	how	much	data	is	collected	and	
analyzed	[19].	In	any	classification,	a	linear	parametric	classifier	will	always	make	predictions	
based	on	a	 linear	decision	boundary	between	 classes,	whereas	 a	non-parametric	classifier	
can	 learn	 a	 non-linear	 boundary	 whose	 shape	 grows	 more	 complex	 with	 more	 data.	
Analogously,	 parametric	 independent	 component	 analysis	 (ICA)	 and	 principal	 component	
analysis	 (PCA)	 require	 presetting	 the	 component	 number,	 yet	 the	 form	 and	 number	 of	
clusters	 in	brain	data	 is	not	known	to	neuroscientists.	Such	 finite	mixture	models	may	give	
way	 to	 infinite	 mixture	 models	 that	 reframe	 the	 cluster	 number	 as	 a	 function	 of	 data	
availability	and	hence	gradually	yield	more	clusters	without	bound.	Similarly,	classical	hidden	
Markov	models	may	get	upgraded	to	infinite	hidden	Markov	models	and	we	might	see	more	
applications	of	non-parametric	decision	trees	and	nearest	neighbors	in	future	neuroscientific	
studies.	 Finally,	 it	 is	 currently	 debated	 whether	 increasingly	 used	 "deep"	 neural	 network	
algorithms	with	many	non-linear	hidden	layers	are	more	accurately	viewed	as	parametric	or	
non-parametric.	
A	 crucial	 statistical	 property	 for	 data-rich	 neuroscience	 will	 be	 the	 strength	 of	 non-
parametric	 models	 to	 automatically	 increase	 the	 number	 of	 model	 parameters.	 Many	
interesting	phenomena	 in	 the	brain	 are	 likely	 to	be	 very	 complex.	 Fortunately,	 probability	
theory	 recently	 proposed	 stochastic	 processes	 that	 instantiate	 random	 variables	 ranging	
over	 unlimited	 function	 spaces.	Gaussian	 Processes	 (GP)	 are	 an	 important	 non-parametric	
example	 for	 specifying	 distributions	 on	 unknown	 functions	 to	 place	 minimal	 structural	
assumptions	 or	 constraints	 on	 possible	 interactions	 [20].	 Although	GPs	 instantiate	 infinite	
dimensional	 objects,	 indexing	 a	 subset	 of	 random	 variables	 in	 this	 infinite	 collection	 is	
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ensured	to	yield	multivariate	Gaussian	distributions.	Instead	of	fitting	one	parameter	to	each	
variable	 to	predict	 a	behavior	or	 clinical	 outcome	with	 linear	 regression,	GPs	 learn	 a	non-
parametric	distribution	of	non-linear	functions	to	explain	brain-behavior	associations.	This	is	
likely	 to	 leverage	 predictive	 regression	 and	 classification	 performance	 in	 large-sample	
studies	 in	neuroscience.	For	 instance,	natural	scaling	to	the	high-dimensional	scenario	was	
demonstrated	 by	 a	 GP	 regression	 model	 that	 explained	 70%	 of	 known	 missing	 heritable	
variability	 in	 yeast	 phenotypes	 [21].	 Such	 emergent	 insight	 from	 complex	 non-additive	
interactions	 between	 gene	 loci	 is	 difficult	 to	 infer	 by	 genome-wide	 association	 studies	
(GWAS)	 that	 use	 parametric	models	 to	 explain	 small	 fractions	 of	 total	 heritable	 variation.	
Unfortunately,	 the	computational	 cost	of	parametric	alternatives	 scales	exponentially	with	
interaction	order	and	the	necessary	correction	for	the	multiple	tested	hypotheses	becomes	
challenging.	
As	another	non-parametric	family,	kernel-based	models	can	provide	statistical	advantages	by	
mapping	brain	variables	to	a	 latent	variable	space	[22].	Kernels	promise	effective	modality	
fusion	 to	 incorporate	 heterogeneous	 sources	 given	 that,	 mathematically,	 kernel	 addition	
equates	 with	 concatenation	 of	 variable	 spaces.	 Such	 genuine	 multi-modal	 analysis	 can	
perform	 conjoint	 inference	 on	 behavioral	 indices,	 brain	 connectivity	 and	 function	
phenotypes.	 Non-parametric	 prediction	 in	 classification	 and	 regression	 is	 thus	 performed	
based	on	dot	products	on	the	vectors	of	the	inner	product	space	without	requiring	an	explicit	
mapping	from	the	actual	brain	variables	(i.e.,	"kernel	trick").	In	this	virtual	variable	space	the	
added	dimensions	enable	linear	separability	of	complex	neurobiological	effects	that	are	not	
linearly	 separable	 in	 the	 original	 variables.	 Kernelization	 of	 statistical	 estimators	 inherits	
enriched	 transformation	 of	 the	 input	 data	 that	 only	 grow	 linearly	 in	 dimension	 with	
increasing	 sample	 size.	 Such	 purposeful	 increase	 of	 input	 dimensionality	 and	 model	
complexity	 is	 useful	 for	 small	 to	 intermediate,	 but	 probably	 not	 extremely	 large	 datasets	
because	the	kernel	matrix	can	grow	to	terabytes	scales.	Disadvantages	of	kernels	include	the	
inability	 to	 assess	 contributions	 of	 individual	 variables	 and	 to	 distinguish	 informative	 and	
noise	variables.	Finally,	kernel-based	statistics	relate	to	psychology	in	that	learning	pairwise	
similarity	 measures	 between	 environmental	 stimuli	 is	 an	 aspect	 of	 intelligent	 behavior.	
Radial	 basis	 kernels	were	 argued	 to	 offer	 psychological	 and	 neurobiological	 plausibility	 as	
computational	model	for	human	decision-making	[23].	
	 6	
In	 sum,	 neurobiology	 is	 high-dimensional	 in	 nature	 and	 thus	 difficult	 to	 understand	 for	
human	 intuition.	 By	 expressing	 brain	 phenomena	 in	 some	 finite-dimensional	 space,	
parametric	models	are	more	interpretable,	easier	to	implement,	and	faster	to	estimate.	They	
are	often	 the	best	 choice	 in	data	 scarcity,	 yet	 they	 are	 further	 away	 from	neurobiological	
ground	 truth.	 Exclusive	 reliance	 on	 parametric	 analysis	 of	 brain	 recordings	 may	 keep	
neuroscientists	from	extracting	structured	knowledge	on	emergence	properties	that	can	only	
be	grasped	in	data	richness	[15,	19,	24].	Even	if	more	complex	models	do	not	always	result	in	
greater	insight	[25],	non-parametric	approaches	are	naturally	prepared	to	capture	complex	
relationships.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 complexity	 of	 statistical	 structure	 and	 hence	 extracted	
neurobiological	insight	grow	boundlessly	with	the	amount	of	fitted	data	[19,	26].	This	is	likely	
to	be	important	for	modern	neuroscience	and	personalized	medicine.	
	
Towards	models	that	incorporate	biological	structure?	
The	fact	that	more	interpretable	models	typically	require	more	data	samples	explains	why,	
in	neuroscience,	the	less	data-hungry	discriminative	models	have	been	ubiquitious	in	small-
sample	 studies,	 while	 the	 popularity	 of	 more	 interpretable	 generative	 models	 is	 steadily	
increasing	with	 recent	 data	 availability	 (Box	 2).	 For	 instance,	 hidden	Markov	models	 have	
recently	 been	 applied	 to	 high-dimensional	 temporal	 data	 of	 magnetencephalographic	
recordings	[27].	These	generative	models	simultaneously	inferred	the	spatial	topography	of	
the	major	brain	networks	subserving	environment	responses	and	their	cross-talk	dynamics	
without	anatomical	assumptions.	The	model-immanent	estimation	of	the	joint	distributions	
between	the	voxel	 inputs	has	 identified	100-200ms	windows	of	coherent	spatiotemporally	
states	and	their	exact	functional	coupling	occurring	faster	than	previously	thought	(i.e.,	both	
are	 hidden	 variables).	 As	 another	 example,	 neuroscientists	 often	 conceptualize	 behavioral	
tasks	 as	 recruiting	 multiple	 neural	 processes	 supported	 by	 multiple	 brain	 regions.	 This	
century-old	notion	[28]	was	 lacking	a	formal	mathematical	model.	The	conceptual	premise	
was	 recently	 encoded	 with	 a	 generative	 model	 [29].	 Applying	 the	 model	 to	 10,449	
experiments	across	83	behavioral	 tasks	 revealed	heterogeneity	 in	 the	degree	of	 functional	
specialization	within	 association	 cortices	 to	 execute	 diverse	 tasks	 by	 flexible	 brain	 regions	
integration	 across	 specialized	 networks	 [29,	 30].	 As	 a	 clinical	 example,	 dynamic	 causal	
modeling	 for	 model-induced	 variable	 spaces	 and	 ensuing	 group	 classification	 by	 learning	
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algorithms	 were	 combined	 to	 infer	 neurobiologically	 interpretable	 manifolds	 underlying	
aphasia	 [31].	 Their	model	 identified	 the	 directed	 interregional	 connectivity	 strengths	 that	
distinguish	 aphasic	 and	 neurotypical	 individuals.	 This	 generative	 modeling	 approach	 was	
more	explanatory	than	brute-force	prediction	based	on	activity	extent	or	linear	correlations.	
The	 influence	 exerted	 from	 right	 planum	 temporale	 and	 right	 Heschl's	 gyrus	 on	 their	 left	
counterparts	 turned	 out	 as	 candidate	mechanisms	 underlying	 communication	 impairment	
and	 formally	 discarded	 other	 plausible	 auditory	 processing	 schemes.	 Such	 generative	
approaches	 may	 refine	 diagnosis	 and	 treatment	 of	 spectrum	 disorders	 in	 neurology	 and	
psychiatry.	
Moreover,	 generative	 approaches	 to	 fitting	 biological	 data	 have	 successfully	 reverse-
engineered	 i)	 human	 facial	 variation	 related	 to	 gender	 and	 ethnicity	 based	 on	 genetic	
information	alone	[32],	ii)	the	complexity	gradient	in	the	ventral-visual	processing	hierarchy	
which	 confirmed	 encoding	 of	 low-/mid-/high-level	 facets	 in	 V1,	 V2,	 and	V4	mostly	 known	
from	 animals	 [33],	 iii)	 structural	 content	 from	 naturalistic	 static	 images	 by	 revealing	 an	
explicit	inverse	mapping	between	occipital	activity	and	retinotopic	stimulation	[34],	iv)	video	
scenes	 from	 naturalistic	 movies	 enabled	 by	 revealing	 importance	 of	 separately	 modeling	
slow	 and	 fast	 visual	 movement	 [35],	 and	 v)	 brain	 atlases	 of	 semantic	 specificity	 from	
naturalistic	 speech	 reinforcing	 the	 intuition	 that	 various	 different	 semantic	 features	 are	
widely	 distributed	 in	 the	 cortex	 [36].	 Finally,	 it	 is	 becoming	 increasingly	 clear	 that	 neural-
network	models	constitute	a	class	of	computational	architectures	[37]	that	lend	themselves	
particularly	 well	 to	 representation	 and	 manifold	 learning	 tasks	 [38].	 In	 particular,	
autoencoders	 are	 modern	 neural-network	 models	 that	 have	 been	 formally	 shown	 to	
generalize	commonly	employed	representation	discovery	techniques,	such	as	ICA	and	PCA	as	
well	as	clustering	models	[39,	40].	Autoencoder	architectures	therefore	have	the	generative	
potential	 to	extract	 local	 (brain-area-like)	and	global	 (brain-network-like)	 representation	to	
abandon	 hand-crafted	 "feature	 engineering"	 made	 difficult	 by	 missing	 ground	 truth	 [41].	
Neurobiologically	 valid	 representations	 are	 revealed	 as	 sets	 of	 predictive	 patterns	 that	
together	 explain	 psychological	 tasks	 and	 disease	 processes	 without	 being	 constrained	 to	
functional	 specialization	 into	 distinct	 regions	 or	 functional	 integration	 by	 brain	 networks.	
The	 predictive	 validity	 of	 the	 discovered	 functional	 compartments	 thus	 extends	 the	
interpretational	spectrum	offered	by	explained-variance	approaches	like	ICA	and	PCA.	
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In	sum,	neuroscientists	can	afford	more	generative	models	as	brain	data	become	abundant.	
In	 contrast	 to	 discriminative	models,	 their	 naturally	 higher	 interpretability	 could	 open	 the	
black	box	of	 the	neural	 processing	 architectures	underlying	behavior	 and	 its	 disturbances.	
Generative	 models	 enable	more	 detailed	 understanding	 by	 exposing	 the	 low-dimensional	
manifolds	embedded	within	high-dimensional	brain	data.	However,	"the	more	detailed	and	
biologically	 realistic	 a	model,	 the	 greater	 the	 challenges	 of	 parameter	 estimation	 and	 the	
danger	of	overfitting"	[42].	A	crucial	next	step	in	neuroscience	might	lie	in	extracting	actual	
pathophysiological	mechanisms	 from	brain	measurements	 in	mental	disorders.	 In	contrast,	
applying	discriminative	approaches	on	patients	grouped	by	the	diagnostic	manuals	DSM	or	
ICD	 could	 recapitulate	 categories	 that	 are	 neither	 neurobiologically	 valid	 nor	 clinically	
predictive	[43].	Finally,	discriminative	models	may	be	less	potent	to	characterize	the	neural	
mechanisms	 of	 information	 processing	 up	 to	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 of	 recovering	 subjective	
mental	experience	from	brain	recordings	[31,	44-46].	
	
Towards	integration	of	traditional	modeling	regimes?	
After	the	19th	century	was	driven	by	Bayesian	and	the	20th	century	by	frequentist	statistics	
[47],	 one	might	wonder	 about	 their	 relative	 contributions	 in	 the	 21st	 century.	 These	 two	
attitudes	towards	quantitative	investigation	are	the	most	common	distinction	in	statistics	in	
general	 [48]	 and	 in	 neuroscience	 in	 particular	 [49,	 50],	 yet	 orthogonal	 to	 the	
parametric/non-parametric	and	discriminative/generative	perspectives	on	statistical	models	
[48].	 Overall,	 the	 many	 desirable	 properties	 of	 Bayesian	modeling	 and	 interpretation	 are	
contrasted	by	the	computationally	feasibility	of	frequentist	models	in	high-dimensional	data	
(Box	 3).	 In	 neuroscience	 the	 speed-accuracy	 tradeoff	 in	 Bayesian	 posterior	 inference	 has	
been	advantageously	rebalanced	using	variational	Bayes	for	 limited	computational	budgets	
on	a	number	of	previous	occasions.	This	 includes	Bayesian	time-series	analysis	 [51],	model	
selection	for	group	analysis	[50]	and	mixed-effects	classification	for	imbalanced	groups	[52].	
Bayesian	 inference	 is	 an	appealing	 framework	by	 its	 intimate	 relationship	 to	properties	of	
firing	 in	 neuronal	 populations	 [53]	 and	 the	 learning	 human	 mind	 [44].	 Additionally,	 it	 is	
important	 for	 currently	 increasing	efforts	 in	 transdiagnostic	 clinical	 neuroscience	 [54]	 that	
Bayesian	 hierarchical	 models	 could	 elegantly	 handle	 class	 imbalances	 with	 very	 unequal	
group	 sizes.	 Moreover,	 inferring	 hierarchies	 of	 statistical	 relationships,	 a	 natural	 way	 of	
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inducing	 parsimony,	 is	 difficult	 or	 impossible	 in	 a	 frequentist	model	 selection	 regime	 and	
much	more	feasible	in	a	Bayesian	model	averaging	regime.	
In	 particular,	 recent	 advances	 in	 non-parametric	 Bayesian	 methods	 [55]	 combined	 with	
extensive	 datasets	 promise	 progress	 in	 longstanding	 problems	 in	 cognitive	 and	 clinical	
neuroscience.	 As	 a	 key	 problem	 in	 cognition,	 neuroscientists	 have	 not	 agreed	 on	 a	
description	 system	 of	 mental	 operations	 (called	 'taxonomy'	 or	 'ontology')	 that	 would	
canonically	 motivate	 and	 operationalize	 their	 experiments	 [56,	 57].	 As	 a	 key	 problem	 in	
medicine,	partly	shared	neurobiological	endophenotypes	are	today	believed	to	contribute	to	
the	 pathophysiology	 of	 various	 neurological	 and	 psychiatric	 diagnoses	 (called	 'nosology')	
despite	 drastically	 different	 clinical	 exophenotypes	 [31,	 43,	 58].	 As	 an	 interesting	
observation,	both	these	neuroscientific	challenges	can	be	statistically	recast	as	latent	factor	
problems	 [cf.	 59].	 The	 same	 class	 of	 statistical	 models	 could	 both	 identify	 the	 unnamed	
building	blocks	underlying	human	cognition	and	the	unknown	neurobiological	mechanisms	
underlying	 diverse	 mental	 disorders.	 For	 instance,	 hierarchical	 Bayesian	 models	 were	
recently	borrowed	from	the	topic	modeling	domain	to	estimate	a	latent	cognitive	ontology	
[60]	 and	 neurobiological	 subtypes	 in	 Alzheimer’s	 disease	 [61].	 Further,	 formal	 posterior	
inference	in	non-parametric	Bayesian	models	could	gracefully	handle	complexity	in	the	brain	
by	estimating	the	number	of	latent	factors	in	cognition	and	disease	using	Chinese	Restaurant	
Processes	 [62],	 relative	 implications	 of	 latent	 causes	 in	 neurobiological	 observations	 using	
Indian	Buffet	Process	[63],	as	well	as	 induce	hierarchies	of	cognitive	primitives	and	disease	
endophenotypes	 using	 Hierarchical	 Dirichlet	 Processes	 [64].	 Cluster	 detection	 in	 the	 non-
parametric	 Bayesian	 regime	 exchanges	 the	 neurobiologically	 implausible	 winner-takes-all	
property	of	traditional	clustering	by	allowing	each	observation	to	participate	in	all	clusters.	
Crucially,	the	non-parametric	aspect	of	these	Dirichlet	Process	models	allows	the	number	of	
inferred	clusters	to	grow	organically	with	increasing	sample	size.	
In	 sum,	 the	 scalability	of	model	estimation	 in	 the	data-rich	 scenario	 is	 calibrated	between	
frequentist	 numerical	 optimization	 and	 Bayesian	 numerical	 integration.	 Ingredients	 from	
both	statistical	regimes	can	be	advantageously	combined	by	adjusting	the	modeling	goal	[65,	
chapter	 5,	 66].	 Many	 frequentist	 methods	 reliant	 on	 gradient-based	 optimization	 can	 be	
recast	 as	 Bayesian	 integration	 problems,	 for	 instance	 using	 Hamiltonian	MCMC	methods.	
Conversely,	 integration	 problems	 can	 be	 turned	 into	 optimization	 problems,	 for	 instance	
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using	 variational	 Bayes	 approximations.	 High-dimensional	 data	 have	 been	 authoritatively	
argued	to	motivate	novel	blends	between	simplier-to-use	frequentist	and	more	 integrative	
Bayesian	modeling	aspects	[47].	Indeed,	the	continuously	increasing	number	of	observations	
and	 number	 of	 parameters	 to	 estimate	 have	 earlier	 been	 predicted	 to	 complicate	 logical	
consistency	 in	 statistical	 theory	 [67].	We	 therefore	 believe	 that	 the	 recent	 emergence	 of	
extensive	 datasets	 in	 neuroscience	 could	 analogously	 prompt	 emergence	 of	 more	
frequentist-Bayesian	hybrid	approaches.	
	
Towards	diversification	of	statistical	inference?	
Drawing	statistical	inference	on	regional	brain	responses	during	controlled	experiments	has	
largely	 hinged	 on	 classical	 null-hypothesis	 rejection,	 but	 is	 increasingly	 flanked	 by	 out-of-
sample	prediction	based	on	cross-validation	[68,	69].	Both	inferential	regimes	provide	formal	
justifications	 for	 deriving	 neurobiological	 knowledge	 using	 mathematical	 models	 (Box	 4).	
Classical	 inference	 measures	 the	 statistical	 significance	 associated	 with	 a	 relationship	
between	 typically	 few	 variables	 given	 a	 prespecified	 model.	 Generalization	 inference	
assesses	the	robustness	of	patterns	between	typically	many	variables	 in	the	data	[70].	One	
might	 think	 that	 these	 differences	 in	 deriving	 formal	 conclusions	 on	 brain	 recordings	 are	
mostly	of	 technical	 relevance	but	 there	 is	an	often-overlooked	misconception	 that	models	
with	high	explanatory	power	always	exhibit	high	predictive	power	[71,	72].	A	neurobiological	
effect	assessed	to	be	statistically	significant	by	a	p-value	may	sometimes	not	yield	successful	
predictability	based	on	cross-validation,	and	vice	versa.	Their	theoretical	differences	are	also	
practically	 manifested	 in	 the	 high-dimensional	 setting	 where	 classical	 inference	 needs	 to	
address	the	multiple	comparisons	problem	and	generalization	inference	involves	tackling	the	
curse	of	dimensionality	[73,	74].	
Consequently,	 care	 needs	 to	 be	 taken	 when	 combing	 both	 inferential	 regimes	 in	 data	
analysis	 [68,	 69].	 Say,	 a	 neuroscientist	 wants	 to	 predict	 Alzheimer	 diagnosis	 from	 the	
>100,000	 brain	 location	 per	 brain	 scan	 by	 sparse	 L1-penalized	 logistic	 regression	 (i.e.,	
classification	 with	 minimal	 necessary	 variables)	 using	 cross-validation	 but	 performs	
preliminary	 dimensionality	 reduction	 to	 the	 most	 important	 10,000	 voxels	 by	 ANOVA-
mediated	 variable	 ranking	 using	 classical	 inference.	 In	 this	 case,	 it	 is	 not	 permitted	 to	
conduct	an	ordinary	significance	test	(i.e.,	classical	inference)	on	the	obtained	sparse	model	
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coefficients	 (obtained	from	generalization	 inference)	because	 it	would	 involve	recasting	an	
originally	 high-dimensional	 variable-selection	 as	 a	 univariate	 setting	 [75].	 The	ANOVA	 test	
would	ignore	the	fact	that	the	sparse	logistic	regression	had	already	reduced	the	variables	to	
the	most	 important	ones	[72].	Very	recently	proposed	methods	for	so-called	post-selection	
inference	 allow	 replacing	 naive	 by	 selection-adjusted	 p-values	 for	 a	 set	 of	 variables	
previously	 chosen	 to	 be	 meaningful	 predictors	 [76].	 This	 and	 similar	 clashes	 between	
inferential	regimes	will	probably	increase	in	neuroscientific	data	analysis.	
However,	 classical	 inference	 and	 generalization	 inference	 have	 also	 been	 advantageously	
joined	towards	a	same	neuroscientific	goal.	 In	a	first	example,	cross-validated	classification	
algorithms	 estimated	 the	 relative	 contribution	 of	 all	 macroscopical	 brain	 networks	 in	 a	
battery	 of	 psychological	 tasks,	 while	 ANOVA	 was	 used	 to	 find	 smaller	 subsets	 of	 most	
important	networks	for	each	task	[45].	In	a	second	example,	Latent	Dirichlet	Allocation	[77]	
was	 used	 to	 find	 a	 nested	 hierarchy	 of	 volume	 atrophy	 endophenotypes	 in	 Alzheimer's	
disease,	while	 these	were	cross-validated	by	distinct	 trajectories	 in	memory	and	executive	
function	 decline	 using	 classical	 hypothesis	 testing	 [61].	 More	 generally,	 a	 neurobiological	
question,	such	as	"Are	region	A	and	B	significantly	connected?",	can	also	be	cross-validated	
by	 an	 independent	 method	 that	 can	 make	 the	 same	 observation,	 such	 as	 significant	
structural	 and	 functional	 connectivities	 [78].	 The	previous	 two	examples	performed	 cross-
validation	in	a	different	kind	of	data,	in	contrast	to	the	typical	practice	of	performing	cross-
validation	in	unseen	data	of	the	same	kind.	This	is	important	because	fMRI,	EEG,	MEG,	fNIRS,	
and	 other	 neuroscientific	methods	measure	 biological	 phenomena	 only	 indirectly.	 Out-of-
sample	 generalization	 to	 a	 different	 modality	 (e.g.,	 behavior,	 genetics,	 microbiomics)	
increases	 confidence	 that	 the	 findings	 reflect	 neurobiological	 reality.	 Combining	 different	
inferential	regimes	can	therefore	corroborate	neurobiological	findings.	
In	 sum,	 the	 leap	 from	 quantitative	 brain	 measurements	 to	 neurobiological	 knowledge	 is	
secured	by	statistical	inference.	There	is	not	one	but	several	different	types	of	inference	that	
can	 ask	 a	 same	 question	 with	 different	 mathematical	 foundations	 requiring	 differently	
nuanced	 neuroscientific	 interpretation.	 Historically,	 classical	 inference	 was	 invented	 for	
problems	with	small	samples	that	can	be	addressed	by	plausible,	handpicked	models	with	a	
small	number	of	parameters	 [cf.	79].	 Some	authors	 therefore	emphasize	 that	 "one	 should	
never	use	sum	of	squared	errors,	p-values,	R2	statistics,	or	other	classical	measures	of	model	
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fit	on	the	training	data	as	evidence	of	a	good	model	fit	in	the	high-dimensional	setting."	[80,	
p.	 247,	 their	 emphasis].	 P-values	 and	 other	 classical	 guarantees	 may	 lose	 their	 ability	 to	
evaluate	 model	 fit	 in	 high-dimensional	 data.	 Instead,	 out-of-sample	 generalization	 by	
successful	cross-validation	to	independent	data	will	be	increasingly	used	given	natural	tuning	
to	problems	with	more	variables	and	larger	samples	[cf.	24].	Envisioning	a	future	of	precision	
medicine,	only	cross-validated	predictive	models	can	obtain	answers	from	a	single	data	point	
[42].	Finally,	data	richness	will	increasingly	require	preliminary	dimensionality-reduction	and	
feature-engineering	procedures,	 including	 k-means	 clustering	 and	 ICA	decomposition,	 that	
do	not	themselves	perform	statistical	 inference.	A	back	and	forth	between	dimensionality-
reducing	 data	 transformations,	 inductive	 pattern	 extrapolation	 and	 deductive	 hypothesis	
testing	of	the	discovered	candidate	effects	will	become	valid	routines	in	neuroscience.	
	
Concluding	Remarks	and	Future	Perspectives	
After	 astronomy,	 particle	 physics,	 and	 genetics,	 massive	 data	 is	 the	 new	 reality	 in	
neuroscience	and	medicine.	Rich	datasets	can	extend	the	spectrum	of	possible	findings	and	
permissible	 conclusions	 about	 the	 brain.	 Yet,	 the	 unavoidable	 impact	 on	 data	 analysis	
practices	is	currently	shunned.	While	sample	size	and	information	granularity	are	increasing	
progressively,	 the	 prompted	 shift	 in	 statistical	 choices	may	 be	 categorical.	Neuroscientists	
need	 to	 extend	 their	 modeling	 instincts	 towards	 neurobiological	 insight	 with	 gradually	
increasing	quality	of	 insight	as	data	accumulate	 [12]	and	towards	prediction	on	the	single-
individual	level	[81].	It	is	difficult	to	overstate	the	importance	of	closing	training	gaps	in	next-
generation	 PhD	 curricula	 that	 will	 include	 machine-learning,	 computer	 programming,	
distributed	 multi-core	 processing,	 and	 advanced	 visualization	 [82].	 In	 a	 nutshell,	
neuroscience	 is	 entering	 the	 era	of	 large-scale	 data	 collection,	 curation,	 and	 collaboration	
with	a	pressing	need	for	statistical	models	tailored	for	high-dimensional	inference.	These	will	
frequently	 lie	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 statistical	 repertoire	 cherished	 today.	 Analyzing	
extensive	multi-modal	 datasets	with	 inappropriate	 statistical	models	would	 be	 a	waste	 of	
public	financial	resources	and	our	limited	scientific	efforts.	
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TEXT	BOX	1:	Parametric	and	non-parametric	models	
This	 statistical	 distinction	 takes	 place	 at	 the	 equilibrium	 between	 imposing	 specific	
assumptions	 (i.e.,	 parametric)	 and	 not	 assuming	 a	 certain	 functional	 form	 (i.e.,	 non-
parametric)	 to	 encourage	 discovery	 of	 relevant	 structure	 driven	 by	 the	 brain	 data	
themselves	 [19,	 83].	 Contrary	 to	 common	misunderstanding,	 both	 classes	 of	 quantitative	
modeling	 involve	 parameters.	 "Non-parametric"	 is	 defined	 in	 three	 different	 flavors:	 The	
first,	 perhaps	 most	 widespread	 meaning	 implies	 those	 statistical	 estimators	 that	 do	 not	
make	explicit	assumptions	about	the	probability	distribution	(e.g.,	Gaussian)	from	which	the	
data	 have	 arisen.	 As	 a	 second,	more	 intuitive	 explanation,	 non-parametric	models	 do	 not	
assume	that	 the	structure	of	 the	statistical	model	 is	 fixed.	The	 last,	most	 formal	definition	
emphasizes	that	the	number	of	model	parameters	 increases	explicitly	or	 implicitly	with	the	
number	of	available	data	points	(e.g.,	number	of	brain	recordings).	In	contrast,	the	number	
of	model	parameters	are	fixed	in	parametric	models	and	do	not	vary	with	sample	size	(Fig.	
1).	 In	 its	 most	 extreme	 manifestation,	 effectively	 fitting	 an	 arbitrary	 functional	 form	 can	
result	 in	 non-parametric	 models	 larger	 in	 memory	 usage	 than	 the	 actual	 input	 data	
themselves.	 Flexible	 non-parametric	 models	 include	 decision	 trees	 like	 random	 forests,	
nearest-neighbor	estimators,	kernel	support	vector	machines	or	kernel	principal	component	
analysis,	 and	 hierarchical	 clustering,	 as	 well	 as	 bootstrapping	 and	 other	 resampling	
procedures.	More	rigid	parametric	models	include	methods	from	classical	statistics	based	on	
maximum	 likelihood	 estimation,	 Gaussian	 mixture	 models,	 support	 vector	 machines,	
principal	component	analysis,	and	k-means	clustering,	but	also	modern	penalized	regression	
variants	like	Lasso,	ElasticNet,	and	RidgeRegression.		
It	 is	an	advantage	of	parametric	modeling	to	expresses	the	data	compactly	 in	a	few	model	
parameters,	which	increases	interpretability,	requires	smaller	datasets,	has	higher	statistical	
power,	 and	 incurs	 lower	 computational	 load.	 Additionally,	 if	 the	 parametric	 assumptions	
hold	"true"	in	nature,	non-parametric	approaches	can	be	less	powerful	than	their	parametric	
counterparts.	 Although	 parametric	 and	 non-parametric	models	 require	 assumptions,	 non-
parametric	models	 have	 the	 advantage	 to	 be	more	 robust	 about	 estimating	 properties	 of	
still	poorly	known	phenomena	in	the	brain	if	the	modeling	assumptions	are	partly	false.	Due	
to	 their	 robustness,	 non-parametric	 methods	 may	 prevent	 improper	 use	 and	
misunderstanding.	 Most	 importantly,	 even	 if	 the	 number	 of	 parameters	 in	 parametric	
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models	can	be	manually	 increased,	only	non-parametric	models	have	an	inherent	ability	to	
automatically	scale	with	the	complexity	of	the	available	data	resources.	
	
	
Figure	1	(in	Box	1):	Prediction	based	on	parametric	versus	non-parametric	regression	
Fitted	models	that	predict	the	continuous	outcome	Y	based	on	the	observed	variables	X1	and	
X2.	Left:	Ordinary	linear	regression	finds	the	best	plane	to	distinguish	high	and	low	outcomes	
Y.	Middle/Right:	K-nearest	neighbor	regression	predicts	 the	same	outcome	Y	based	on	the	
K=1	 (middle)	 or	 K=9	 (right)	 closest	 data	 points	 in	 the	 available	 sample.	 Parametric	 linear	
regression	 cannot	 grow	more	 complex	 than	a	 stiff	 plane	 (or	hyperplane	when	more	 input	
dimensions	Xn)	as	decision	boundary,	which	entails	big	regions	with	identical	predictions	Y.	
Non-parametric	nearest-neighbor	regression	can	grow	from	a	rough	step-function	decision	
boundary	(k=1)	to	an	always-smoother	fit	(k=9)	by	incorporating	the	data	in	more	complex	
ways.	Non-parametric	models	 therefore	outperform	parametric	alternatives	 in	many	data-
rich	scenarios.	Reused	with	permission	from	[80].	
	
	
TEXT	BOX	2:	Discriminative	and	generative	models	
Discriminative	models	are	common	choices	when	best-possible	prediction	of	neurobiological	
phenomena	 is	 the	primary	aim	(e.g.,	based	on	behavioral	phenotype,	age,	performance	or	
clinical	scores),	which	does	not	require	recovery	of	the	explicit	relationships	between	input	
variables	 (Fig.	 2).	 Generative	 models	 also	 aim	 at	 successful	 extrapolation	 of	 statistical	
relationships	to	new	data	but	simultaneously	extract	special	neurobiological	structure	from	
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brain	 data	 by	 indirectly	 inferring	 the	 target	 variable	 from	 hidden	 variables	 [85].	 Typical	
discriminative	 models	 include	 linear	 regression,	 support	 vector	 machines,	 decision-tree	
algorithms,	and	logistic	regression,	while	generative	models	include	hidden	Markov	models,	
modern	neural	network	algorithms,	dictionary	learning	methods,	and	many	non-parametric	
statistical	 models	 [77].	 As	 an	 important	 advantage	 in	 brain	 science,	 generative	 modeling	
approaches	 are	 more	 expressive	 in	 extracting	 representations	 in	 input	 data	 that	 are	
"economical	to	describe	but	allow	the	input	to	be	reconstructed	accurately”	[86].	
More	 formally,	 discriminative	 models	 focus	 on	 a	 target	 variable	 y,	 whereas	 generative	
models	 are	 concerned	 with	 the	 joint	 distributions	 between	 observed	 and	 unobserved	
variables	 [84].	 Discriminative	 models	 find	 a	 direct	 mapping	 function	 by	 predicting	 a	
categorical	 or	 continuous	 target	 variable	 y	 by	 estimating	 P(y|x)	 without	 capturing	 special	
properties	 in	 the	 data	 x.	 Generative	 models	 estimate	 relevant	 properties	 in	 the	 data	 by	
P(y|x)	from	P(x|y)	and	P(y).	Generative	models	can	hence	produce	synthetic,	never	observed	
examples	 x~	 for	 targets	 y	 by	 sampling	 from	 the	 estimated	 joint	 distributions	 P(x,y).	 The	
strength	of	generative	models	to	conjointly	realize	predictive	modeling	and	representation	
learning	 is	paid	by	requiring	more	 input	data,	more	computational	 resources,	and	possibly	
more	model	parameters	to	fit.	Consequently,	with	too	few	data	points	available	for	model	
estimation,	discriminative	models	will	usually	achieve	better	prediction	performance	in	new	
data	 because	 generative	 models	 suffer	 from	 higher	 model	 variance.	 Finally,	 generative	
models	make	an	assumption	about	the	distribution	of	the	input	data	and	their	performance	
therefore	suffers	more	if	this	model	is	inaccurate.	Discriminative	models	are	generally	more	
robust	to	assumptions	about	the	data-generating	process.	
	
Figure	2	(in	Box	2):	Class-conditional	densities	can	be	more	complex	than	class	posteriors	
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Generative	 models	 (left)	 estimate	 P(x|y=c)	 by	 indirectly	 fitting	 mechanisms	 in	 data	
conditioned	on	the	class	c.	Discriminative	models	 (right)	estimate	the	posterior	probability	
P(y=c|x)	 to	 directly	 quantify	 the	 presence	 of	 class	 c	 conditioned	 on	 the	 data	 x	 without	
capturing	data	mechanisms	underlying	 that	class.	 It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	peaks	of	 the	
class-conditional	 densities	 P(x|y=c)	 have	 no	 impact	 on	 the	 class	 posteriors	 P(y=c|x).	 Only	
generative	models	can	therefore	produce	new,	unseen	examples	x~	from	the	captured	input	
distributions	characteristic	for	class	c.	Figure	reused	with	permission	from	[65].	
	
	
TEXT	BOX	3:	Frequentist	and	Bayesian	models	
In	 theory,	 the	 frequentist	attitude	aims	at	universally	acceptable,	 investigator-independent	
conclusions	 on	 neurobiological	 processes	 by	 avoiding	 hand-selected	 priors	 on	 model	
parameters.	 The	 Bayesian	 attitude	 is	 more	 transparent	 in	 the	 unavoidable,	 necessarily	
subjective	introduction	of	existing	domain	knowledge	as	model	priors.	Frequentist	modeling	
achieves	 best-guess	 values	 (often	 without	 uncertainty	 interval)	 treating	 the	 model	
parameters	as	 fixed	unknown	constants	and	averaging	over	 input	data	treated	as	random.	
Instead,	 ideal	 Bayesian	 modeling	 achieves	 full	 posterior	 distribution	 estimates	 (including	
intervals)	by	averaging	over	the	random	model	parameters	rather	than	the	data.	Frequentist	
approaches	 typically	 perform	model	 selection	 to	 obtain	 model	 parameters	 by	 maximum	
likelihood	 estimation	using	 numerical	 optimization.	 Bayesian	 approaches	 typically	 perform	
model	averaging	by	 integrating	over	model	parameters	 conditioned	on	prespecified	priors	
by	approximate	resampling	solutions	from	Markov	chain	Monte	Carlo	(MCMC)	variants.	
In	practice,	statistical	models	span	a	continuum	between	the	extreme	poles	of	frequentism	
and	 Bayesianism.	 They	 exhibit	 many	 unexpected	 similarities	 [65,	 83].	 For	 instance,	 the	
bootstrap	is	a	frequentist	method	for	population-level	inference	of	confidence	intervals	and	
non-parametric	null-hypothesis	testing	[87]	that	also	lends	itself	to	Bayesian	interpretations	
[70].	Frequentist	practitioners	are	mostly	concerned	about	model	overfitting,	while	Bayesian	
practitioners	 are	more	 concerned	 about	 the	 pertinence	 and	 number	 of	 domain-informed	
priors.	
Important	 for	 data-intensive	 brain	 science,	 the	 frequentist-Bayesian	 tradeoff	 impacts	 the	
computational	 budget	 required	 for	 model	 estimation	 (Fig.	 3).	 Generally,	 the	 more	 one	
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adheres	to	frequentist	instead	of	Bayesian	ideology,	the	less	computationally	expensive	and	
the	 less	 technically	 involved	 are	 the	 statistical	 analyses.	 It	 is	 a	 widespread	 opinion	 that	
Bayesian	models	do	not	scale	well	 to	the	data-rich	setting,	although	there	 is	 little	work	on	
the	behavior	of	Bayesian	methods	 in	high	dimensions	 [88,	89].	While	 the	pure	 frequentist	
approach	 computes	maximum	 likelihood	estimation,	 the	pure	Bayesian	approach	achieves	
inference	by	full	posterior	probability	distributions	computed	by	asymptotically	exact	MCMC.	
Given	 their	 computational	 cost,	MCMCs	 have	mainly	 been	 used	 for	 small-scale	 problems.	
The	 practical	 applicability	 of	 Bayesian	 methods	 has	 been	 greatly	 enhanced	 through	 the	
development	of	approximate	inference	algorithms	such	as	variational	Bayes	and	expectation	
propagation	[90].	Nevertheless,	exact	MCMC	and	its	accelerated	approximate	variants	tend	
to	suffer	 from	 i)	uncertainty	when	convergence	 is	 reached,	 ii)	difficult-to-control	"random-
walk"	behavior,	 and	 iii)	 limited	 scaling	 to	 the	high-dimensional	 setting	 [91].	 Consequently,	
the	intractability	of	Bayesian	posterior	integrals	motivated	a	rich	spectrum	of	model	hybrids	
[47].	 There	 is	 an	 increasing	 trend	 towards	 incorporating	 appealing	 Bayesian	 aspects	 into	
computationally	cheap	frequentist	approaches	[e.g.,	92].	
	
	
Figure	3	(in	Box	3):	Different	shades	of	Bayesian	inference	
There	 is	 no	 unique	 Bayesian	 formulation	 to	 perform	 statistical	 inference,	 but	 there	 is	 a	
variety	 of	 them.	 For	 instance,	 type-II	maximum	 likelihood	 or	 empirical	 Bayes	 has	 genuine	
frequentist	properties,	does	not	 specify	a	prior	distribution	before	visiting	 the	data,	and	 is	
often	 used	 in	 non-Bayesian	 modeling.	 Generally,	 the	 more	 integrals	 to	 be	 solved	 or	
approximated,	 the	higher	 the	computational	budget	needed	 for	model	estimation.	Reused	
with	permission	from	[65].	
	
	
BOX	4:	Null-hypothesis	testing	and	out-of-sample	generalization	
Statistical	 inference	 can	 be	 generally	 defined	 as	 the	 extraction	 of	 new	 knowledge	 from	
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parameters	 in	 mathematical	 models	 fitted	 to	 data	 [15].	 In	 classical	 inference,	 invented	
almost	100	years	ago	[93],	the	neuroscientist	articulates	two	mutually	exclusive	hypotheses	
by	domain-informed	judgment	with	the	agenda	to	disprove	the	null	hypothesis	embraced	by	
the	 research	 community.	 A	 p-value	 is	 then	 computed	 that	 denotes	 the	 conditional	
probability	 of	 obtaining	 an	 equal	 or	 more	 extreme	 test	 statistic	 provided	 that	 the	 null	
hypothesis	 is	 correct	 at	 the	 conventional	 significance	 threshold	 alpha=0.05	 [94].	 For	
instance,	 statistical	 significance	of	 the	 Student’s	 t-test	 indicates	 a	 difference	between	 two	
means	with	a	5%	chance	after	sampling	twice	from	the	same	population.	Adopting	deductive	
reasoning	 and	 a	 mostly	 retrospective	 viewpoint	 [95],	 state-of-the-art	 hypotheses	 are	
continuously	 replaced	 by	 always	 more	 pertinent	 hypotheses	 using	 verification	 and	
falsification	 in	a	Darwinian	process.	The	classical	 framework	of	null-hypothesis	 falsification	
to	 infer	 new	 knowledge	 is	 still	 the	 go-to	 choice	 in	 many	 branches	 of	 neuroscience.	
Considering	 the	 data-rich	 scenario,	 it	 is	 an	 important	 problem	 that	 p-values	 intrinsically	
become	better	(i.e.,	 lower)	as	the	sample	size	 increases	[96].	 In	some	fields,	 it	 is	 therefore	
now	mandatory	to	report	effect	sizes	in	addition	or	instead	of	p-values	[94].	
In	contrast,	generalization	inference	emerged	much	more	recently	in	basic	statistics	[97]	and	
tests	 whether	 complex	 patterns	 extrapolate	 to	 independent	 data	 using	 cross-validation.	
Formally,	 this	 inferential	 regime	 is	 mathematically	 justified	 by	 the	 so-called	 Vapnik-
Chervonenkis	 (VC)	dimensions	 from	 statistical	 learning	 theory,	 conceptually	 related	 to	 the	
degrees	 of	 freedom	 from	 classical	 statistics	 [98].	 In	 generalization	 inference	 on	 high-
dimensional	patterns,	the	VC	dimensions	formally	express	the	circumstances	under	which	a	
class	of	functions	is	able	to	learn	from	a	finite	amount	of	data	to	successfully	predict	a	given	
neurobiological	 phenomenon	 in	 unseen	 data	 [99].	 Thus,	 the	 VC	 dimensions	 provide	 a	
probabilistic	 measure	 of	 whether	 a	 certain	 model	 is	 able	 to	 learn	 a	 distinction	 given	 a	
dataset.	 This	 inductive	 reasoning	 to	 learn	 a	 general	 principle	 from	 examples	 adopting	 a	
mostly	prospective	viewpoint	contrasts	the	deductive,	retrospective	logic	of	null-hypothesis	
testing.	 In	 practice,	 cross-validation	 is	 frequently	 used	 to	 quantify	 the	 out-of-sample	
performance	by	an	unbiased	estimate	of	a	model's	 capacity	 to	generalize	 to	data	 samples	
acquired	in	the	future	[100].	Model	assessment	is	done	by	training	on	a	bigger	subset	of	the	
available	data	(i.e.,	training	set)	and	subsequently	applying	the	trained	model	to	the	smaller	
remaining	part	of	data	(i.e.,	test	set).	
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